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Martina De Gramatica, Fabio Massacci (Member, IEEE), Woohyun Shim, Alessandra Tedeschi,
and Julian Williams
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Abstract—Physical security is well understood in Civil Aviation and its
rules are mandated across the board from small airports with few flights
to hubs aggregating thousands of flights and millions of passengers.
To finance security procedures diverse mechanisms from government
subsidies to per-passenger taxes and charges have been implemented.
A popular scheme is the flat security tax per passenger of e5-7 in
Europe and $5.6 in the US. A key question is whether the same
regulatory and financial measures should apply to cyber-security. We
present the results of interviews with key stakeholders (European and
National Regulators, IATA and Eurocontrol Experts, Airport Directors,
and Security Managers) on this emerging threat and a cyber-security
public policy economic model for Civil Aviation. We illustrate how inter-
dependency issues impacting the probability of a successful attack can
make regulation significantly unfair for small or medium airports.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent ICT incidents caused by accidental failures of
air traffic management systems show that the risk of a
successful cyber-attack in civil aviation is an increasingly
emerging threat. A notable example is the failure of
a UK National Air Traffic Services server in 2013 that
kept the communications network in ‘night-time mode’
with severely reduced capacity resulting in 300 canceled
flights and 1400 delayed ones.
Prior research on terrorism and reports from national
and international government agencies have warned that
the next generation of terrorist attack could take place
by exploiting cyber-security vulnerabilities, [1], [2]. By
perpetrating an attack through electronic communica-
tions networks, a terrorist does not need to have physical
access to an airport but can have the same as or even a
bigger impact than a traditional terrorist attack on civil
aviation facilities.
Whilst cyber-security is an evolving discipline, phys-
ical security in aviation is well understood and heavily
regulated [3]. In comparison with other sectors (e.g. PCI
DSS for the payment industry), these regulations are
very detailed and many measures are applied across the
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board: the security experience of a passenger boarding
in a small airport is essentially the same of a passenger
in a large hub.
A key question is should cyber-security regulation follow
the same financing approach used for physical security?
In the framework of the SECONOMICS project
(www.seconomics.org) we have tried to answer it by
combining qualitative and quantitative research meth-
ods. We first present the results of semi-structured in-
terviews with key stakeholders (European and National
Regulators, IATA and Eurocontrol Experts, Airport Di-
rectors, and Security Managers) on this emerging threat.
Then, we provide a game-theoretic model of the inter-
action among airports, attackers and a policy-maker, as
decisions made by each agent affect decisions of the
other agents. The model also considers the interconnec-
tivity among airports to capture partial non-excludability
of security investments, since the security level of one
airport can contribute toward the reduction of security
risks in other airports.
Our calibrated simulation analysis from the model,
and the evidence from the interviews, show that simply
extending the security regulatory and financial instru-
ments (e.g. mandating the same expenditure and a flat
security tax per passenger) from the physical to the cyber
domain may lead to an unfair economic treatment of
small and medium airports.
2 CYBER-SECURITY FOR AVIATION
The aviation industry is one of the industries heavily
relying on ICT in managing its daily critical operations.
Fig.1 illustrates how Terminal 5 in Heathrow Airport
depends on an extensive ICT infrastructure [4]. The
introduction of IT-enabled aircrafts Airbus A380 and
Boeing B777 also increases the potential impact of cyber-
security incidents (e.g. Aircraft takeover).
The NextGEN program in the US and the SESAR
program in the EU will further introduce additional
ICT technologies to boost capacity and decrease costs of
aviation. Isolated system will migrate to an IP-based in-
frastructure, the System Wide Information Management
(SWIM). It will allow better decision making by giving
all actors more accurate and timely information but it
may potentially lead to larger data breaches.
2Fig. 1. ICT services and devices used in Terminal 5 of Heathrow airport, U.K. It involves 1,500 camera CCTV systems,
1,100 secure access control points, a wireless LAN with 750 access points, and 2,800 analogue, digital and IP
telephones. From [4] with permission from the publisher.
Another innovative concept is the Remote and Virtual
Tower (RVT): landing and departure operations at air-
ports are controlled by a central, remotely operated site
and the physical view of the airport, originally available
from the physical tower, is replaced by virtual reality
and remote sensors. The first RVT was announced in
November 2014 for O¨rnsko¨ldsvik Airport in Sweden.
RTVs bring significant cost saving but sci-fi scenarios
of cyber-criminals replacing sensor feeds with fake ones
becomes concrete threats. The USA FAA Administrator
M. Huerta already acknowledged in 2011 that “With that
evolution [NextGen] the cyber-security risks will increase.”
The Association of Airport Directors [5] has classified
cyber-threats into three groups: subvertible IT systems;
theft and fraud causing direct financial losses to airlines,
airports and passengers; and terrorism. Cyber-attacks
in conjunction with physical attacks may be used to
increase potency or be the core focus to exploit cyber
to physical effect (e.g. by malicious attacks on SCADA
or other critical equipment) or to embarrass commercial
entities and act as a conduit for a political message.
The aviation sector has started to set new policies to
address some of these threats and to promote common
cyber-security standard. In 2013, the European Com-
mission issued a document aiming at defying a shared
cyber-security strategy of the cyberspace, encouraging
industry to cooperate at the national level and to agree
on a set of cyber- security measures among all the EU
airports. In 2013, IATA, the international umbrella of
airlines, started to develop a toolkit to support airlines
in setting up a cyber-security management system.
Yet, few airports have cyber-security measures in
place: the main airport of Birmingham (UK’s second
largest city by population) implemented cyber-security
measures through a Corporate Risk Assessment pro-
gram; Asheville airport (NC, US, with over 700,000 pas-
sengers in 2010) recently adopted its own cyber-security
policy to evaluate and handle cyber-incidents [5].
Cyber-security does not come for free, and financing
cyber-security will likely use the same mechanisms of
traditional security. The US uses a centralized model
where security activities are primarily the responsibility
of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
TSA is funded partially through direct taxes, and partly
on a general subsidy model: a flat rate tax of $5.6 per
passenger is raised per each flight segment to cover
around 40% of the budget. The remaining part is funded
by the general budget of the Federal Government [6].
In Europe, there is no common rule for who should
pay for security [7], [8]. Some countries (Austria, Fin-
land, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) follow a cen-
tralized financing model (states collect taxes and redis-
tribute them to airports for funding security costs), other
countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland,
Netherlands, and the UK) follow a decentralized model
(security is the responsibility of the airport under a
central authority supervision) and make airports directly
pay for security through charges imposed on passengers.
Yet, the final emerging outcome is a flat rate levied
on a per-passenger basis [7] ranging between e5 and
e7. It is often hardly enough to cover the costs: “In
312 of the 13 [European] States with operating deficits [...],
the airports fund the major proportion of the deficit.” [7,
pag.48]. Different considerations are true for the US
where essentially the Federal Government is funding the
deficit and thus subsidizes unprofitable airports.
Would this financing mechanism be equally adequate
for cyber-security regulations?
3 STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS
The empirical evidence behind our study has been col-
lected through several interviews with airport stake-
holders along the qualitative study design suggested
by [9]. We have organized several meetings with over
60 stakeholders, on different topics such as optimal
expenditures allocation, effectiveness of security training
programs, attack scenarios, etc. Not all interactions could
be recorded or transcribed for security reasons (e.g.
attacks to the tower). For 19 stakeholders, who agreed
to be formally interviewed, we conducted in-depth 30-40
minute semi-structured interviews which were recorded
with permission and transcribed in anonymous form.
The final 6 interviewees reported in Table 1 have been
selected by a purposive sampling method to represent
a variety of roles specifically involved in the regulatory
aspects of emerging threats in the aviation domain. The
aim of these semi-structured interviews was to discuss
the main issues related to the emerging threats in the
aviation domain, and the effectiveness of security reg-
ulation to mitigate these upcoming risks. Opinions and
findings from other interviews underlay this study, and
clarified security issues and the economic model.
All interviewees agreed that risks from cyber-threats
are particularly hard to quantify in terms of features,
boundaries and potential consequences, and it is mostly
regarded as “unknown” threats. They revealed that the
main hurdle towards strategies for effective countermea-
sures lies in the intrinsic uncertainty of cyber-threats:
“We are aware of the cyber-attack, but so far it is not easy to
say what the emerging risks are and what their consequences
may be” [#2], commented an European regulator.
This feature increases the complexity and the limits of
the risk assessment and management, and is mentioned
together with the high interconnectivity within the sector
and among sectors as the factors that may expose the
aviation domain to additional vulnerabilities [#1]. The
consequences of cyber-attack could therefore be more
severe than those of traditional attacks.
Cyber-threats therefore are perceived differently from
traditional threats and pose additional challenges in the
identification of aviation security regulations that could
appropriately cover and address these new risks: “The
issue is that we already envisage a fast and quick change in a
lot of processes, like the Air Traffic Management and we have
to adapt very quickly to respond to the new threat scenarios.
This is becoming more and more challenging. I am not sure
that we will be able with the current regulatory framework
and the current management of security to move at the same
pace than the threats” [#1].
Due to the international and trans-sectorial nature of
cyber-threats, a more trans-border and inter-sectoral col-
laborative security regulation would be required: “[The
problem here is] the lack of a global framework for cyber-
security in aviation. We need to address cyber-security in
aviation in a more holistic way, meaning all security actors
and all aviation players have to be encompassed under the
same framework. The regulation has to consider all these
aspects” [#1]. This statement reflects lack or delay of a
common policy addressing cyber-security issues: ICAO
reported that five major international aviation organiza-
tions signed a roadmap towards aviation cyber-security
agreement only in Dec. 2014.
The request for broader security regulation is com-
bined with the need for more flexibility, allowing air-
ports to apply it consistently with their specific structure
and needs. The prescriptive and static nature of the
current normative corpus is strongly criticized mainly
by airport managers interviewed [#4, #6], in favor of a
more risk-based approach that should consider: “[Ad-
ditional] plug-ins to the normal baseline regulation” [#3],
fitting the specificity of different airports. The preference
accorded by the interviewees to a risk-based approach
is supported by the need of a contextual, shared and
complete risk assessment to be done in collaboration
with international regulatory bodies and national avia-
tion authorities: “There should be evaluations done [. . . by. . . ]
ICAO or EU Commission and at a national level by each
Government, according to the threats that are expected by
those Governments. This is very important to say: threats
could vary, there could be high risk in some areas and low
risk in other areas” [#3].
Regulation should be based on the real risk, in order to
be effective [#1], a direction toward which EU regulators
are trying to move: “What we are trying to do is to give
airports different options to deliver the same outcomes. The
small airport may choose to invest more in people than in
technology but the big airports may invest more in technology
because it is more efficient” [#2].
A unified but more flexible regulation seems to be a
more appropriate policy to cover the current and future
threats addressing the aviation domain, mostly in rela-
tion to the economic means available by small airports.
The current regulation, however, as it is perceived also
by ATM experts, seems to favor mainly big airports in
the directives: “If there are regulators which are part of the
government authority, and they are consulting with airports
for a new decision, big airports have bigger chances than
do small airports” [#3]. The prescriptive application of
security requirements mandated by a regulator causes
harsh problems of investments for small airports relying
on smaller budget [#1, #4, #5, #6], though they must face
similar problems tackled by bigger airports and provide
the same level of security [#2]. To meet these strict
directives, small airports must either claim exceptions
and dispensations from the mandated regulation or risk
financial losses [#4, #5].
4TABLE 1
Participants to the Interviews
ID Role Institution Interview Date
1 Head of ATM Security Unit European Authority for Air Navigation Nov. 2014
2 EU Aviation Regulator EU Directorate for Transport Nov. 2014
3 Responsible of Security Training programs IATA Nov. 2014
4 Security Manager and Training Instructor Airport and Civil Aviation Authority Dec. 2014
5 Security Manager Airport Dec. 2014
6 Security Manager Airport Dec. 2014
4 A REVIEW OF REGULATORY MODELS FOR
CYBER-SECURITY
While the previous literature has made contributions
in the field of economics of cyber-security, there has
been no application that particularly studies an issue on
fair cost allocation for cyber-security in civil aviation.
In other research domains, many authors have studied
the issues of fair cost allocation (e.g., [10], [11], [12]).
They mainly argue that, since large-scale networks con-
sist jointly of many agents and complex traffic flows,
the design of networks should consider not only the
minimization of total costs but also the fair allocation of
these costs in order to achieve a high level of efficiency.
For example, in the field of civil aviation, O’Kelly [11]
and Thomson [12] investigate an efficient solution for
fair cost allocation in airport networks.
In the cyber-security domain, research using a game-
theoretical model has recently started to receive huge
interest by the research community. Since the pioneering
contributions by scholars, such as Varian [13] and Ander-
son [14] several scholars have employed game-theoretic
approaches to illustrate issues related to cyber-security.
In particular, a new focus on attacker and target strategic
interactions in game-theoretic model has been recently
proposed. For example, Ioannidis et al. [15] pay their
attention to externalities and the interactions between
attackers and defenders in a security environment. They
analyze the incentives of defenders to make investments
in security, and identify a role of a policy-maker for
structuring socially optimal security investments.
Another point that has recently drawn attention of
researchers and practitioners in cyber-security [16], is a
policy design principle for establishing and maintain-
ing a sound cyber-ecosystem. The growing role of the
governments in cyber-security has been recognized, but
there has been little agreement on which policy design
should be employed. In a companion paper in SECO-
NOMICS Deliverable 6.4 we discuss the implications for
policy-makers behind the choice between risk-based and
rule-based regulations.
In this study, we try to link the above-mentioned
fields together. Specifically, building on [15], our model
considers various airports operating and making secu-
rity investments jointly in the network, and includes
the interaction between and among airports, attackers
and a policy-maker, and the role of attacker behavior in
analyzing airports’ strategic investment decisions. Using
a simulation technique, we then explore whether current
security regulation can apply to cyber-security from the
perspective of economic fairness.
Traditional cyber-security models make a reasonable
assumption that permits mathematical tractability: the
absence of interdependence. In the economic jargon they
assume no direct positive externalities. The only exter-
nalities are those manifested by the strategic interactions
of the agent in the game.
This is definitely not true in Civil Aviation. Airports
are definitely independent legal entities, but are intercon-
nected by construction and such interdependence can be
approximately measured by traffic volumes among air-
ports. In the physical domain this is part of the day-by-
day experience of passengers: a security check in a spook
airport makes it possible to land in a hub airport and
continue to a connecting flight without going through
security again. The regulation mandating a security
checkpoint at all airports creates positive externalities for
the connecting hub airport.
When a policy coordinator is present, airports can
exploit potentially positive security externalities, such as
common frontiers and standards. Traditional studies as-
sume that financing follows regulations but, as indicated
in both interviews [#1, #4, #5, #6] and domain studies
[7], state-mandated security requirements and global
financial mechanisms can be inconsistent and cause a
cost allocation problem among airports. By employing
a game theoretic model we provide a quantitative evi-
dence that the extension of the current policy to cyber-
security might undermine the fairness in the network.
5 A CYBER-SECURITY ECONOMICS MODEL
FOR CIVIL AVIATION
We assume that airports are divided in categories, in-
dexed by i. For tractability we assume that airports
within each category are identical and when faced with
the same set of information make identical choices. A
natural classification of airports is to use traffic volume
of the airport: large airports (i = 1) are hubs with highest
traffic; medium airports (i = 2) are airports feeding large
hubs and working also as “small-scale” hubs for small
airports; and small airports (i = 3) as outlying airports
with very low traffics. From observation of the clustering
of traffic, we believe that three types are sufficient to
capture the cross sectional variation in airport. From
the traffic data of 509 European airports [17], around
5TABLE 2
Traffic information on sample airports
#pass/year Average Traffic/day #pass/day coming from
#flights #pass Large Airports Medium Small
Large (e.g. Munich, DE) 37.7M 680 101.370 18.182 48.205 34.983
Medium (e.g. Verona, IT) 2.7M 222 7.397 3.226 1.467 2.704
Small (e.g. Ancona, IT) 0.5M 20 1.479 565 652 262
Munich is the second hub of Lufthansa in Germany, the 7th European Airport and 27th worldwide; Verona, in a touristic/industrial
region in Northern Italy, is a “feeder airport” for the Lufthansa’s hubs and other national carriers (e.g. British Airways) and some
low-cost airlines; Ancona’s airport, in a touristic region on the Adriatic Sea, is only served by Lufthansa, the national carrier
Alitalia and three low cost airlines (e.g. Ryanair).
3% of the airports are large airports (15 airports), 10%
are medium airports (50 airports) and the rest are small
airports (444 airports). The difference in scale among
them is illustrated in Table 2.
Each airport would like to minimize its expected loss:
U(i) = σi(X,ni)Li + xi. (1)
where X = 〈x1, . . . , xi, . . .〉 represents the investments
of all airports, ni the number of attackers per airport of
type i, Li the loss of the airport and σi the probability
of a successful attack.
Rational attackers will participate in an attack as
long as the deterministic cost of entering the market
for attacks is lower than the expected profit. At the
equilibrium, the entry/exit condition should be:
Ntypes∑
i=1
σi(X,ni)Ri · ni = C. (2)
where σiRi is the expected reward for the fraction of
ni attackers on the airport of type i, and C is the cost
of mounting an attack to the airport network. The Nash
equilibrium is determined by solving simultaneously the
equations above for all xi and ni.
The key issue is to identify an appropriate functional
form for σi, the probability of successful attacks. Our
proposal contains four factors capturing some important
socio-economical features.
σi(X,ni) = Ai · nβi · e−αixi · e−
∑n
j=1
τijδijxj . (3)
The first three factors have been already used in the
economics of cyber-security literature. The factor Ai is
the probability that an attack made against type i airport
is successful when there is no additional cyber-security
expenditure. It essentially captures the preferences of
the attacker for some type of airports over another. In
general
∑
iAi ≤ 1 as an attacker might prefer other
alternatives (e.g. hack a power station). The factor nβi
tells how an increase in the marginal number of attackers
multiplies the chances of success. For σ to be a proba-
bility, the fraction of attackers across airports has to be
less than unity, on which all stakeholders agreed.
The factor e−αixi captures the effectiveness of security
investments such that i) increasing xi diminishes σi but
ii) the marginal benefit of additional xi decreases with
the investment. All stakeholders agreed that investments
do not scale linearly: after investing a million euro, any
additional euro yields a negligible benefit; only a very
large additional investment brings visible changes.
The fourth term is our innovative contribution. It has
the same shape of the third factor (so property i) and ii)
holds), and captures the security externalities: δij shows
the extent to which the security level of a target airport
type depends on the security level of other types of
airports; τij represents an actual structural characteristic
of the relationships between different types of airports
in the aviation ecosystem.
Notice that σiLi decreases as xi rises, and increases
as ni rises, yet at the same time the “loss” due to xi
increases. So airport i seeks a sweet spot where the
security expenditure is not so high, but still high enough
to discourage attacker (low ni) and minimize expected
losses (low σiLi). Furthermore, the investments of other
airports xj may have beneficial effects and thus airport
i might decide to lower its investment xi by reaping the
beneficial effects of those who invest. The parameters are
summarized in Table 3.
To analyze the game we first consider a case without
a policy-maker: type i airports choose xi based only on
their private incentives and do not consider ecosystem
externalities (δij = 0). The corresponding Nash equilib-
rium might not be socially optimal as each airport makes
an investment decision non-cooperatively to minimize
its own expected loss.
Next, we then introduce a policy-maker in the game.
Since he prioritizes building socially desirable security
conditions, he will consider externalities (δij 6= 0). The
policy-maker has a single composite objective func-
tion consisting of all airports’ expected loss functions∑
iWiU(i), and shapes a policy to drive all airports’
decisions toward the Pareto optimum.
A “political” problem here is that security financing
may not follow the mandated security measures and
thus the chosen levels of security investments might not
be allocated fairly: a policy regulating security invest-
ments is Pareto-efficient but some airports might be im-
posed to carry a significantly heavier burden than they
would bear by acting on their private incentives. This
might need to be addressed by redistributive measures.
6TABLE 3
Description of model parameters
Airports and Attackers Policy-maker and environment
Li Airport’s losses for successful attack Wi Social planner’s weight for Type i airport
Ri/C Attacker’s reward/cost ratio for successful attacks fi Fraction of type i airports
Ai Airport’s baseline risk τij Fraction of traffic volume between types i and j airports
αi Airport’s marginal risk reduction by additional xi δij Interdependence coefficient between type i and j airports
β Elasticity of success when num. of attackers increases σi Prob. of successful attack on target i given x1 . . . xn and ni
xi Airport’s security investment ni Number of attackers per target i
6 SIMULATION OF POLICY IMPACT
The Nash equilibrium in the absence of interdependence
can be analytically solved whilst the equation for the so-
cial optimum combines transcendental and linear terms
and is not analytically solvable. The socially optimal
solution must be found numerically by simulation.
For the simulation, various parameters are inputed
from the airport information (e.g. Table 2). Li is es-
timated from the number of days of potential airport
shutdown and canceled flights. From studies on natural
disasters [18], [19], we assume that a successful attack
results in e50K loss per canceled flight for at least
seven days. By multiplying for the number of daily
flights, Li is e238M for a large airport, e77.7M for a
medium airport, and e7M for a small airport. Some
losses can be transferred to airlines. Yet, airlines will
eventually abandon an airport and move elsewhere if
the cost transfer from the airport is considered financially
unviable. A policy makers would also include loss of life
as well as damage on society as a whole, yet those losses
would be immaterial to the particular airport where the
incident takes place, and could be treaded as constants
We calculate τij as the ratio (Iij+Iji)/
∑
i
∑
j Iij where
Iij denotes total number of inbound traffic from type i
airports to type j airports. In rough terms 10% of the
ongoing traffic of a large airport goes to other large air-
ports and 27% goes to medium airports (confirming the
business model of hub-and-spook). However, this 10%
is shared among only 15 airports whereas the remaining
63% is shared among over 350 airports. The bulk of the
traffic goes to medium and small airports in aggregate
but each airport only benefits for a small fraction of it.
Some parameters cannot be directly estimated and
must be calibrated from other data. For the baseline
risk Ai, most stakeholders agreed that attackers would
simply chose a well known, nearby airport. Thus, we
assume the chances of selecting an airport to be inversely
proportional to the number of airports of that type as
the more “identical” airports there are, the less likely is
an airport to be selected: Ai = (1/Ni)/(
∑n
1 1/Ni). As a
result, we get A1 = 0.750, A2 = 0.225 and A3 = 0.025.
This is a worst case scenario because
∑
iAi = 1: in
absence of additional protection measures some airport
will be surely cyber-attacked. This is not necessarily
true and lower values for Ai might be used if some
information about the intrinsic preference for airports
over other targets is available.
To identify αi, recall that it captures the effectiveness
of security countermeasures mandated by the policy
makers. They are unwilling to have a serious incident
before di days and will likely require technologies such
that the probability of accidents is below the threshold
σi · Ii ≤ 1
di
(4)
where Ii is the number of inbound flights per day. We
can then use Eq.(??) to rewrite Eq. (3) as
αi =
log di + log Ii + logAi
xi
(5)
Eq.(??) makes it clear that αi, as mandated by the policy
maker, depends from the policy makers acceptable di
and its expectation on the attractiveness Ai of airports
as targets. All interviewees stated their ideal target as
“never”, so di should be at least a decade: di = 10×365.
To identify xi, we use directly the average value of
the security tax per passenger e6. Hence α1 = 0.071,
α2 = 0.766 and α3 = 2.786. The interviewed regulators
indicated that they regard all airports equally. We there-
fore set W1 =W2 =W3.
Lastly, we must calibrate parameter values for attack-
ers. As for a point estimate of Ri/C, since a cyber-attack
on an airport can draw nationwide, or even worldwide
attention, we assume that such reward is 10-fold the cost.
Using a similar assumption in [15], β is considered
to have the value of 0.1 as cyber-attackers’ efficiency
is relatively high due to the characteristics of cyber-
attack. To investigate whether the security expenditures
imposed by the policy-maker are fair we run the follow-
ing experiment:
1) We start from a small interdependence coefficient
δij = 0.1% because the SESAR/NextGen envisaged
interconnection has yet to be fully operational.
2) We progressively increase the interdependence co-
efficient up to 20%.
3) For each value of δij , we calculate the optimal
investment per passenger that a policy-maker could
fix by accounting for positive externalities.
4) We compare this investment with the investment
that airports would make without social interven-
tion (Nash Equilibrium).
Figure 2 (a,b,c) illustrates what happens if δij increase
simultaneously for all airports. As δij increases, for
example by implementing IT-based interconnected net-
works such as SWIM (i.e., δij = 20%), the social optimal
7(a) Large Airports (b) Medium airports (c) Small airports
Solid line represent the optimal expenses calculated by a policy-maker accounting for interdependency, dashed
line is Nash equilibrium. The interdependence increases equally among all airport types. Smaller airports have the
unfairest treatment they have to pay more than the e6 received from taxes. Big airports make a large profit from
a fixed e6 security charge.
(d) Large airports (e) Medium airports (f) Small airports
The interdependence increases only among small and large airports (e.g. by deploying a remotely operated tower).
The medium airport ends up with an unfair burden. They can’t recover their costs from the e6 flat charge. After
8% increase in interdependency small airports start making a profit over the e6 charge. Big airports make a profit
anytime but smaller than above.
Fig. 2. Effects of Changes in Interdependence Coefficient.
expenditures make medium and large airports invest
much less in security than small airports, comparing to
Nash equilibrium security expenditures. Medium and
large airports get greater benefits from the rule than
small airports. With limited interconnection they will be
forced by the policy-maker to spend more (e10) than
they would spend if let on their own (e8 at the Nash
equilibrium) and well above the e6 current tax they are
receiving from the government. So, they are actually
paying more than they would. Only at 15% of δij , they
break even with the government tax. In contrast, big
airports security investments are globally high but, per
passenger, are well below the e6 government tax. They
are profiting from security charges.
The degree of δij may also change unevenly between
airports of different types. For example, (d), (e) and
(f) in Figure 2 show a case where the policy-maker
enacts a regulation that increases interdependence be-
tween large and small airports, δ13. A paradigmatic case
is the deployment of RTVs whereby small airports are
controlled by a remote control center which is likely to
be located at a large airport. In this case, the unfairness in
security expenditures becomes severe since a cost burden
on small and large airports gets much less than Nash
equilibrium while medium airports are not affected by
the regulation and are made to invest more than Nash
equilibrium. Large airports and to some extent small
airports benefit from the RTV deployment.
To check the robustness of our findings we conducted
additional simulations by varying several parameter
values, for example, changes in αi by decreasing di to
5 × 365, by making A2 or A3 higher than A1, and by
having Ri to be between 1-fold to 20-fold the cost. There
was no qualitative change in the findings. The intuition
for this result can be seen from the last three columns of
Table 2: the massive imbalance in term of traffic between
airports cannot be compensated by reasonable variations
in the model parameters.
7 GUIDANCE RECOMMENDATIONS
This study offers a contribution to the ongoing discus-
sion on cyber-security in civil aviation.
8The simulation analysis shows that a policy-maker
might ask smaller airports to spend more on cyber-
security per passenger than larger airports do as security
IT interdependence increases. Essentially, the power-
law distribution of passengers traffic is such that the
large airports benefit from IT interdependence and from
the cyber-security investments of small airports. Small
airports become net contributors to the social good.
This unfairness in cost allocation for cyber-security be-
comes more severe under the current security financing
rule of a flat security fee per passenger. In this situation,
the larger airports might actually make profits out of
security fees while smaller airports will have to subsidize
security costs from other revenues.
In summary, using a current financing mechanism for
cyber-security might not be suitable for allocating a joint
and fair cost burden among airports as it may over-
burden some airports. Cyber-security regulation should
identify redistribution mechanisms of either security
costs or security taxes. One of such mechanisms could
be sharing the security revenues between hubs and their
feeder airports.
Similar considerations would apply to the cyber-
security costs in other industries where there is interde-
pendence and massive disproportion in interconnectivity
such as for internet service providers and aggregators.
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